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Abstract 
 
 
Using the "budget-based scheme" approach developed by Kirby et.al. (1991) 
and Reichelstein (1992), this paper establishes the optimal policy function in 
order to control "hidden actions" from managers of Public Water Utilities (PWU) 
regarding investments that deviate from the Optimized Business Plan (OBP), 
with the purpose of inducing managers to reduce deviation from the execution 
of not programmed investments in the OBP and from programmed investments 
that were not executed. We find a high percentage of investment (47%) that 
deviates from its OBP. However between 16% and 35% of executed investment 
that it deviates from its programmation, can be controlled by the PWU manager 
with a compensation payment schemes.  
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I. Introduction 
A major portion of the investment executed by the Public Water Utilities (PWU) 
in  Peru  is  not  planned  through  its  Optimized  Business  Plan  (OBP).  These 
investment amounts that deviate from the planned investment are not monitored 
by the regulator (National Supervision of Sanitation-SUNASS) due to the high 
costs involved. Many projects executed by municipalities and transferred to the 
PWU for operation are not monitored by the utility. This creates incentives to 
Board and to managers for seeking to control the PWU budget and implement 
projects  without  adequate  supervision.  As  a  consequence,  managers  could 
allocate  the  budget  in  a  discretional  way,  without  adequate  planning,  and 
increase the likelihood for the utility to work inefficiently. 
Chahuara and Lucich (2011) show that PWU that do not follow the regulation 
through  the  OBP  are  technically  less  efficient.  The  OBP  establishes  tariff 
structures and performance targets associated with the investment program for 
a  five  years  period.  The  OBP  evaluates  the  relevance,  efficiency  and 
effectiveness of the projects with the goal to determine through efficient costs, 
the tariff level associate to the quality of the sanitation services.  
The regulatory framework does not prevent the PWU to execute investments 
that have not been programmed in the OBP in the extent they can achieve the 
performance goals established in tariff plans and execute some percentage of 
their income into investment. The penalty could be established ex post, only 
when the PWU has not reached the performance goal of the service quality 
established  by  SUNASS  in  the  tariff  study,  but  refers  exclusively  to  non-
compliance targets and it do not refer to the inefficiencies that these projects 
executed outside the OBP could generate. 
The present study aims to know the measure in which the investment executed 
by the PWU is not included in the OBP or is deflected from its programming, 
and  also  know  in  which  way  and  how  much  of  these  deviations  can  be 
minimized by using an incentive scheme. 
To achieve these goals, this paper proposes an analytical framework to explain 
the moral hazard present in the investment decisions by managers of PWU that 
are  not  observed  by  the  regulator  (the  hidden  actions),  and  one  incentive 
scheme  as  a  solution  based  on  the  contract  theory  as  a  function  of  proper 
planning  of  investments  that  induce  managers  to  reduce  the  share  of 
investment that has not been programmed into the OBP. 
The main contribution of this paper is the usage of the "budget-based scheme" 
approach  and  the  application  of  the  methodology  proposed  by  Kirby  et.  al. 
(1991) and Reichelstein (1992) to build a menu of compensation payments for 
minimize  the  deviations  in  the  execution  of  the  investment  program  from  a 
Business Plan or OBP (investment-based scheme). 6 
 
The incentive scheme should induce to managers of the PWU to reveal their 
true knowledge about their investment planning capacity, that is, to reveal their 
"type", which will allow them to minimize the deviations in the execution of the 
investment  program  previously  defined.  Also,  unlike  Kirby  et  al.  (1991)  and 
Reichelstein (1992), the main problem that the Principal has to face in our work 
is the maximization of sanitation services. 
After this introduction, we will describe the institutional framework of the PWU, 
highlighting the agency problem. In the third section we will review the literature 
about contracts and incentives for public management. In the fourth section, we 
will  develop  the  analytical  framework  for  an  optimal  policy  to  control  hidden 
actions.  In  the  fifth  and  sixth  section  we  will  estimate  the  portion  of  not 
scheduled investment that can be reduced and the amount of money needed. 
Finally in section seven conclusions will be presented. 
 
II. The agency problem in water public utilities in Peru 
2.1 Stakeholders 
In Peru, provincial municipalities are owners of the Public Water Utilities (PWU), 
except for SEDAPAL, which is a public company operating in Lima, and ATUSA 
which is a private concession in Tumbes. However, the Board of Proprietors 
composed by provincial mayors and the regional government do exert influence 
on the Directory of PWU. The rest of the directory members, between 30% or 
40%, represent the civil society. In turn, the Board appoints and delegates the 
management of the PWU in the CEO, who in some way, by signing contracts of 
exploitation with the Ministry of Housing, Construction and Sanitation (MVCS) 
should be protected from the political interference of the Board of Proprietors. 
As the PWU are municipal companies, the approval of its annual budget and 
the  scale  of  its  staff  remuneration  depend  on  the  Ministry  of  Economy  and 
Finance (MEF). The control exercised by the MEF is decisive for the economic 
and financial management of the PWU. However, in the approval of its budget, 
the  MEF  considers  the  projected  income  of  the  PWU  established  by  the 
regulator in its tariff study. 
Since 2005, tariffs are approved by the National Superintendence of Sanitation - 
SUNASS (before 2005, the law stipulated that tariffs should be approved by the 
mayors  or  their  representatives).  The  tariff  levels  are  set  to  recover  the 
economic efficient costs for providing the service (payback the credit and cover 
the operation and maintenance costs of infrastructure). The tariff increment is 
approved whether the PWU reach the management goals and the quality of 
services provided by the regulator based on the investment program. 7 
 
The  OBP  is  the  main  regulatory  tool  for  setting  tariffs  for  5  years  period. 
Through  the  OBP  the  tariff  structure,  the  investment  program  and  the 
performance goals can be linked. The PWU suggests the OBP to SUNASS for 
preparing the tariff study.  
The  funds  required  by  the  PWU  to  execute  the  necessary  investments  to 
improve sanitation services, beyond the internally generated resources and the 
concessional  loans  from  international  technical  cooperation  (Japan  Bank  for 
International Cooperation (JBIK), Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), Inter-
American  Development  Bank  (IDB), World  Bank  (WB),  etc.),  depend  on  the 
central government, largely through the MVCS, which grants and funds directly 
to the PWU or indirectly through regional or municipal governments, which in 
turn can carry out the projects and subsequently transfer them to the PWU for 
operation and maintenance.  
Graph 1  
Urban Sanitation Sector in Perú - Stakeholders 
 
The  local  authority  (Mayors)  through  the  Corporate  Board  of  the  PWU  can 
induce the orientation of the central government transfers to the execution of 
investment projects. Although the central government can transfer resources 
directly  to  the  PWU  (since  it  is  an  executive  unit  and  has  the  capacity  to 
formulate and execute sanitation projects), tax aspects and others issues can 
induce to the corporate boards to decide to transfer the donations directly to 
their municipalities.  
Finally,  International  technical  cooperation  participates  through  concessional 
loans  with  low  interest  rates,  but  the  approval  depends  on  the  MEF.  This 
institution also analyze the technical feasibility of the projects with funds by the 
central government. 
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2.2 Incentives  
The regulatory framework for PWU does not provide explicit incentives to tackle 
agency  problems  in  the  management  of  the  PWU,  but  rather  assumes  that 
existing  policy  instruments  such  as  the  Exploitation  Contract,  the  Account 
Manual and the Corporate Governance Code, would ensure the delegation of 
management  to  maximize  the  public  interest  and  neutralize  the  political 
interference  of  the  Board  or  the  Shareholders  in  technical  decisions, 
discouraging managers interest on budget control.  
Public management of the PWU, except for the limited participation of workers 
in the utilities, has no explicit incentives to improve the delivery of services. In 
the  context  of  perfect  delegation  of  the  management,  the  incentives  of  the 
regulatory framework are focus in obtain tariffs increases if the PWU reaches 
the performance goals of the quality service and it obtains surpluses for cost 
reduction. 
In this sense, there are two incentive for the PWU in the regulatory framework in 
order to generate the surpluses needed to invest in infrastructure in an ideal 
way and to maximize the quality of the service (considering that this purpose is 
subject  to  the  credit  restriction  in  the  sector):    obtaining  a  benefit  through 
“efficiency gains” between tariff revisions and, increasing the tariff if the PWU 
reaches the performance goals. 
 
III. Literature Review 
Economic  literature  shows  that  there  has  been  intensive  studies  for  the 
regulation for private management of public services through incentive schemes 
based  on  the  theory  of  contracts  to  address  agency  problems  (Laffont  & 
Tirole,1993) since the eighties; however incentive schemes has been little used  
to  address  the  agency  problem  in  the  management  of  public  enterprises, 
specially    under the "public enterprise" approach developed by Rees (1984) 
which considers that the positive goal of a public company may be related to 
different  aspects  of  maximizing  aggregate  welfare  of  society,  such  as  the 
company's  production,  income  and  quality  of  service  or  delivery,  which  is 
precisely the purpose for public management of municipal-owned businesses. 
The agency problem in the management of public utilities that arises when the 
owner, authorities or their representatives (boards of directors, directory, etc.) 
do not have the same interests that manager or when this has no mechanisms 
to counteract the political influence of these actors on technical decisions, is 
reinforced by the difficulties to assess the results and performance of public 
administration and measure the size and efficiency required of the bureaucracy, 
and also by the absence of competition that encourages innovation and cost 9 
 
reduction.  “The  controllers  get  much  of  its  profits  of  the  control  through 
inefficiencies that increase the real costs” (Bustos & Galetovic: 2002), creating 
governance  problems  in  the  company,  avoiding  accountability,  discouraging 
efficiency,  and  establishing  conditions  for  the  manager  do  not  follow  the 
Principal (which can be the mayor, the central government or the regulator), but 
may  follow  his  own  interests  or  those  derived  from  the  collusion.  For  these 
reasons the agency problem in public administration has a negative effect on 
economic efficiency of public management companies (Weimer & Vining: 1998; 
Araral, 2008).  
In  the  case  of  decisions  associated  with  the  assign  of  internally  generated 
resources by PWU, if managers attempt to control more budget without proper 
accountability and outside the regulatory scheme (without following the OBP), 
the managers could make inefficient investment decisions. Chahuara & Lucich 
(2011)  show  that  PWU  do  not  follow  the  OBP  are  less  efficient  technically.  
Also, the low salaries encourage managers to take more risks on their actions 
when the Principal does not observe it. 
To  encourage  efficiency  in  the  private  management  of  public  services,  it  is 
common  to  observe  the  existence  of  incentive  schemes  that  seek  to  share 
efficiency gains between users and the operator resulting from lower operating 
costs (Vogelsang, 2002). 
From the work of Laffont & Tirole (1986) we can understand that these incentive 
schemes allow the control of the "trade off" between how acceptable the cost 
should be transferred to the user and how much risk should the operator take, 
which also allow a rigorous approach to the information asymmetry between the 
regulator and the operator. The relevant aspect of these schemes is to establish 
a  standard  value  which  is  the  benchmark  that  must  be  overcome,  and  the 
portion of these efficiency gains to be shared among participants. Although is 
common  in  these  schemes  to  establish  standard  costs,  there  are  many 
situations in which what is rewarded are the quality of service indicators.  
To  encourage  the  formulation  of  efficient  budgets  and  evaluate  their 
performance, contractual schemes as Fixed Price, Cost Plus or combinations 
thereof  Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee,  Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee,  Fixed  Price  Cost 
Reimbursement  (see  Table  1),  have  been  used  in  the  design  of  contracts 
between  government  and  suppliers  of  goods  and  services  or  executors  of 
projects  These  schemes  have  granted  compensation  for  managers    good 
performance  in  terms  of  achieving  certain  results,  such  as  reducing  costs, 
streamlining procurement and better prices for the provision of these services 
(Reichelstein: 1992). 
These schemes have led not only to improve the cost-based acquisitions (Cost-
based  procurement)  but  also  the  self  regulation  of  public  services.  Table  1 
provides its features. 10 
 
Table 1  
Government Contracts  
Type of contract  Characteristics  Limitations 
Cost Plus  Adjust tariff when the costs vary for maintain 
a rate of return fixed. 
Problem of cost padding 
Fixed Price  Remain  fixed  tariff  and  take  profits  by 
efficiency gains. This contract share the risk 
between agent and principal. 
Its election depends on a) low 
uncertainty  about  technology, 
project  components  and  cost, 
for  avoiding  information  rent, 
and  b)  aversion  to  cost 
padding to users. 
Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee  Fixed fee may be adjusted.  Permit  renegotiation  and 
strategy behavior. 
Cost-Plus-Incentive-
Fee 
Parties can negotiate a cost target T, and 
firm´s  profit  increases  proportionally  with 
cost  underruns  relative  to  the  cost  target, 
form incentive scheme:  a+ b (T-x) 
Problem  to  select  cost  target 
T,  it  generates  lowest  cost-
share parameter b. 
a + b(E –x)  Weitzman (1976) propose T by 
E. 
Fixed  Price  Cost 
Reimbursement 
Simple  Menu:  Cost-Plus  +  Fixed  Price 
(Rogerson, 2003) 
Few use. 
 Source: own 
 
The use of combined scheme has overcome the problems of Fixed Price or 
Cost Plus. Nevertheless the difficulties to renegotiate and to determine a "target 
cost"  (which  can  lead  to  financial  problems  to  the  operators  or  unwanted 
benefits) have not allowed these combined schemes to be efficient when the 
regulator has no ability or certainty to fix the values. 
 
To gain efficiency in the budget management is necessary to avoid the review 
of  the  contract  parameters  and  their  expectations,  and  hence  the  agents 
opportunistic behavior. An alternative to achieve this is the use of mechanisms 
that induce agents to report their own performance or the expected value of 
their action, being, among these, the most efficient mechanism that induces 
agents to tell the truth.  
 
Ijiri et al. (1968) replaces the cost set by the regulator (target cost) in the Cost-
Plus-Incentive-Fee contracts with an officer's report and compares it to what 
happens. The use of reports in the contracts with asymmetric information has 
been  developed  by  the  literature  since  the  work  of  Weitzman  (1976)  by 
supposing that only the manager knows the function distribution for the actual 
outcome  (Kirby  et  al.,  1991).  Reichelstein  &  Osband  (1984)  compare  the 
officer's report with what he expects to happen, and Kirby et al. (1991) adds the 
hidden action to what the agent expects to occur, where compensation is given 
in terms of minimizing bias, that is, plan accordingly. 
The evolution from "the report" to "what the agent expected to happen", with 
and without hidden actions, takes place in the incentive contracts, where the 
agent chooses a “target cost” from a proposed menu. This election represents 11 
 
his expected cost, and then evaluates the difference between the observed cost 
and the reported cost. 
From the mechanisms that lead to "tell the truth" in a context of hidden actions, 
the  “budget-based  scheme”  proposed  by  Kirby  et  al.  (1991)  is  an  efficient 
scheme.  This  mechanism  induces  agents  to  “tell  the  truth”,  rewarding  any 
deviation  between  what  is  reported  and  what  actually  happens.  In  these 
schemes, the optimal linear contracts are those which enable the operator to 
choose the “cost share parameter” "b”. 
Rogerson (2007) states that the optimal linear contract would take place when 
the "types" of firms according to their technology, capacity planning, etc., can be 
differentiated from the choice of contract made by the operator,  being possible 
to represent even the deflection or slack as a best result. This will allow the 
principal to identify the types, through the principle of revelation and adjust the 
rates according to the levels of efficiency that may be required. 
3.1 Reporting incentives   
The budget-based scheme, belonging to the category of lineal contracts menu, 
is an incentive scheme that will address the problem of the presence of moral 
hazard in the agency. This scheme has been developed by Kirby et al. (1991) 
and  applied  by  Reichelstein  (1992)  in  the  German  Defense  Department´s 
government contracts, to assess the work of the administration cost centre in 
which the retribution to the operator has two components: a "target profit" and a 
“bonus” [or penalty] if the operator obtains lower [higher] cost in regards to the 
cost reported to this centre. 
The particularities of this incentive scheme are two: i) both the "target profit" 
a(E)  and  the  "cost  share"  b(E)  are  functions  of  the  "target  cost"  E,  that  is 
reported by the operator and which properties will induce  to report unbiased 
values, and ii) the deviation between the cost observed x and the "target cost" E 
is rewarded or penalized by the "cost share" b(E) (Reichelstein, 1992). 
The scheme works as follows: to start the project, the operator submits its cost 
report E, on which the principal will pay an incentive fee (target profit) a(E) and 
a incentive profit b(E) which is proportional to the budgeted variance (E-x), that 
is b(E)(E-x). 
Thus, if the operator intends to report higher costs than what he is expected to 
get, that is E > z, with the intention of obtaining a higher retribution through the 
bonus, the value of the "parameters" a(.) and b(.) will diminish, and therefore 
also the total compensation value. However, if the reported cost by the operator 
is equal to the cost that the agent expects to get, that is, E = z, maximum 
retribution can be obtained, so the operator should always  report E when he 
expects to happen z.  This  implies  that  a(z)  ≥  a(E) + b(E)*(E-z), so  that  the 12 
 
retribution expected equals a(z) if the true value z is reported. Therefore, this 
report is unbiased (Reichelstein, 1992). 
Thus  the  operator  has  an  incentive  to  reveal  the  truth  about  their  own 
assessment of the project cost. Also, as the principal offers a contract menu, 
the agent's cost report involves choosing a particular incentive function from 
that menu, which also will reveal their type. 
In the context of government contracts, this kind of scheme which induces the 
operator into optimal planning, would allow the Principal to receive unbiased 
information that would be useful in the budget planning process. In this sense, 
from the perspective of cost control, the budget-based scheme is an optimal 
mechanism of incentives that induce the operator to provide unbiased budget 
estimations of the expected costs (Reichelstein, 1992). 
3.2 Performance incentives  
In the context of “hidden actions”, it is expected that the agent incurs in higher 
cost than those would take place in a context without “moral hazard”, adding as 
a consequence of it, a slack or deviation “α” to the “minimum expected cost” µ, 
when obtaining other benefits B(α) as a result of his “hidden actions” α.  Thus, 
the agent expected cost z, within the context of moral hazard is the sum of α 
and µ.  
Whenever  slack  represents the  efficiency  of  the  operator,  where  α  =  0  is  a 
situation of maximum efficiency, the principal will be willing to offer a higher rent 
to the operator in exchange to reduce deficiency levels in his operations. 
In order to accomplish this, the principal will implement an incentive scheme 
[budget based scheme] through an “optimal contracts menu”, that allow him to 
control the amount of slack as a consequence of the definition of an optimal 
policy in function α(µ) of the minimum expected cost µ.  
This  policy  is  represented  by  a  sequence of  different  levels  of slack for the 
entire trajectory of µ, which permits to optimize the objective of the Principal´s 
problem (in Kirby is cost minimizing), that depends, among other things, on the 
maximization of expected benefits by the operators. 
Thus,  it  is  considered  that  an  optimal  contract  is  a  revelation  mechanism 
through which the manager reports its cost parameter E (or ũ) and the Principal 
establishes  (according  to  this  report)  the  manager  retribution  G(.)  and  the 
expected cost z(.) that optimizes the objective function (Kirby et al., 1991). 
Also, the Budget-based scheme leads to a separation of types. In this way, a 
relatively high cost level µ  (which reflects a high type) that would be associated 
with  a  lower  “cost  share  parameter”  b(.)  generates  less  incentives  for  the 
operator to reduce slack, in relation to the benefits of hidden activities B (.).  13 
 
The scheme shows that it is preferable for the Principal to allow the operator 
(who is better informed) to choose from a menu the cost-share parameter b(.). 
The incentive scheme proposed by Kirby et al. (1991) has not been used in the 
literature  to  minimize  the deviations  which  may  arise  in  the  execution of an 
investment program, that is the deviation between programmed projects and 
executed projects, considering that agents have incentives to execute projects 
that differ with originally programmed projects. 
In this sense, our proposal constitute an application of budget-based schemes 
to  regulate  the  agents  behavior  when  not  follow  the  investment  program 
proposed  by  the  regulator  of  water  services  and  sanitation  in  the  Peruvian 
urban area, according to  the theoretical developments and applications of Kirby 
et al. (1991) and Reichelstein (1992). 
 
IV. Analytical framework  
4.1 Problem Description 
Under the assumption of perfect delegation, the PWU as a municipal enterprise 
has  the  goal  to  maximize  the  provision  of  sanitation  services  subject  to  its 
spending capacity and to its budget, approved by the MEF. This institution also 
approves  the  additional  budget,  wages  and  salaries  of  the  PWU´s  workers, 
although the PWU´s income is obtained from the sale of sanitation services. 
In order to maximize this goal, the PWU requests the MEF each year to expand 
its budget in order to improve the service based on the revenue projections 
made by SUNASS in its tariff study. 
However, while the manager has incentives in not following the OBP because of 
the private benefits he obtains by the budget allocation of not planned projects, 
and the inadequate supervision of the budget allocation, the agency problem 
arises between the regulator and the PWU for the compliance of regulations 
regarding the investment program of the OBP. In this situation, although the 
regulator may not observe the manager´s hidden actions (represented by the 
slack), he knows the distribution function of the minimum expected value when 
not following the OBP. 
In this context, we consider the existence of one portion of the investment that 
deviates from its schedule in the OBP, given by z, which affects the productivity 
of factors and therefore the production level of sanitation, by altering the nature 
or composition of the investment program contained in the OBP. The portion z 
is separated into: the minimum expected value when the OBP "µ" has not been 
followed (which is explained by factors beyond the control of the agent) and 
hidden actions properly α that are deviations with respect to “µ”. 14 
 
Given this situation, the Principal introduces an incentive scheme (using the 
budget-based  scheme)  to  reclaim  or  repay  the  manager  G(.)  whether  he 
reduces the investment portion of the unscheduled OBP under his control α.  
For  the  incentive  scheme  to  be  effective,  the  mechanism  should  allow  the 
Principal to control the slack (or unscheduled deviated investments that can be 
controlled),  so  is  possible  to  establish  an  appropriate  trade-off  between  the 
income  that  the  agent  is  allowed  to  get  through  of  B(.)  and  the  reward  (or 
incentives) that is given to induce the agent to improve the quality of the PWU 
provision as a result of the  slack reduction. 
With the aim to control the slack, the principal should solve the agency problem 
by inducing agents to "tell the truth" (E = z), revealing their type and setting the 
optimal policy of “hidden actions” as function of the minimum expected value of 
investment not included in the OBP, considering that the function distribution  is 
known by the Principal. Thus, the parameters of the incentive scheme will be 
based on the value of optimal policy. 
4.2   The model 
The  proposed  model  describes  the  problem  faced  by  the  Regulator,  when 
maximizing  the  sanitation  services  q(.)  subject  to  the  budget  constraint,  the 
incentive-compatibility  constraint  (IC)  and  the  agent  participation  constraint 
(RP), when the Regulator-Principal incorporates an incentive scheme H(.) that 
induces the agent to tell the truth. The Principal provides compensation to the 
PWU  as  a  whole  H(.),  and  other  compensation  to  the  agent  G(.)  from  the 
information reported by the agent. 
The model is solved as if the principal decides in a centralized way how many 
resources R are allocated and how much deviation z from the OBP should be 
allowed to maximize the service, considering that the PWU has a bigger budget 
and the agent will assign a portion of the resources in unscheduled projects in 
the OBP (where a portion α could be avoided), to the extent that the private 
marginal benefit obtained by these actions exceeds the compensation granted 
by the Principal.  
So, the Principal problem is presented by:        
  ( ) ( ) ∫
µ
µ µ µ µ d n z R q Max
z R
) ( ,
(.) ,   
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Subject to: 
0 (.) (.) (.) = − − + G wR pq H  
[ ] ) ( * ) ( ) ( (.) µ z E E b E a H − + = ;    G(.) = γH(.) 
( ) ( ) [ ] u u IC U U , ~ , , ~ , ε µ µ µ µ µ µ ∀ ≥  
( ) µ µ µ ∀ ≥ RP T U ,  
( ) ( ) µ µ µ µ − + = ) ~ ( (.) , ~ z B G U        
Where: 
q(.): billed volume sanitation services (m3). 
R: production factors (capital and labor). This framework no varies on the 
optimum policy. 
Z(µ):  proportion  of  not  programmed  investment.  In  a  more  general 
specification  z  is  z(µ,e),  where  e  is  the  effort  for  the  planning 
improvement. 
p: price per billed volume  (S/./m3). 
w: prices of production factors. 
H(.):  PWU retribution. 
a(E): target profit (depends on report E by PWU). 
b(E): cost-share parametre (depend on the E report by the PWU). 
E:   investment proportion report. 
G(.): agent retribution, it is a portion γ of H(.) 
U(.): agent welfare (utility) function. 
( ) μ , μ ~ U : agent welfare when he reports µ ~ (or E) and the true value is  µ. 
T:  minimum value for participation. 
B(.): agent private benefit function. 
Revenues from the sanitation services and net credit transfers allow the PWU to 
formulate  the  budget  each  year,  considering  the  "current  spending"  and  the 
"capital spending", which will generate an increase in the demand for capital 
and  labor  resources.  On  the  “capital  spending  planning”  the  agent  decides 
whether to follow the schedule set in the OBP(OIB/IMB) or not to follow it. While 16 
 
it  is  true that increasing  the amount of investment has a positive impact  on 
production and spending, the variation in the composition of investments, by 
introducing new projects and by stopping the execution of others would impact 
negatively on production. So qR > 0,   qRR < 0;  qz < 0,   qzz > 0.  
If the manager does not follow the OBP, it is assumed that allocates "controlled 
resources" to unscheduled projects in the OBP, and receives a private benefit 
rate B(.) as function of the portion of the amount of projects assigned this way 
“α”.  
To estimate the “private benefit rate” that one manager would accept for his 
“hidden actions” we should consider the obtained reward by a representative 
private agent in the management of projects for the same amount of money, 
being discounted through the adjustment factor “si”, a set of capabilities that the 
public official has failed to gain, net of the risk of hidden actions itself
1. Thus the 
total profit for the “hidden actions” is defined as BP = B(si. α).M.  It is expected 
that if “α” increases, B(.) also increases but at decreasing rates. 
In  this  situation,  the  Principal  implements  a  scheme  of  incentives  through 
compensation  payments  to  the  agent.  This  incentive  policy  determines  an 
optimal  deviation  level,  as  a  result  of  the  maximization  process  described 
above, with the condition that a(E) is a convex and decreasing function, and 
that b(E) = ´a(E). 
 
It is assumed for simplicity that the manager's compensation G(.),  is equal to a 
portion γ of the transfer of resources H(.) to the PWU, that is, γ H(.). The amount 
of compensation to the manager not only depends on these variables but also 
to the magnitude or amount of the transfer, defined by the Principal, who in turn 
should consider the ability to execute projects in the locality. 
 
Thus,  given  the  allocation  of  the  amount  of  transfers,  the  parameter  γ  will 
achieve  the  fit  between  G´(.)  and  B´(.),  in  the  optimization  process  of  the 
Principal´s problem that determines the optimal deviation “α” . 
 
By  simplifying  the  model,  replacing  G(.)  in  H(.),  and  H(.)  in  the  budget 
constraint, the Lagrangian is as follows: 
𝐿 = � 𝑞(𝑅,𝑧(𝜇))
𝜇 �
𝜇
+ 𝜆�𝐺(.)(1 − 𝗾)/γ + 𝑝𝑞�𝑅,𝑧(𝜇)� − 𝑤𝑅�𝜂(𝜇)𝑑𝜇 
Since  𝑈(𝜇 �,𝜇) = 𝐺(𝜇 �) + 𝐵(𝑧(𝜇 �) − 𝜇), be 𝑈´(𝜇) = −𝐵´(𝑧(𝜇 �) − 𝜇) 
                                                           
1 Shleifer & Vishny (1994), consider the public manager get from politician, as a private benefit, a portion ("α") of the transfer net 
of unproductive expenditure promoted by politician, paying a fee for participating in this action.   
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and  𝑈 �(𝜇) = ∫ 𝐵´(𝑧(𝑡) − 𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + 𝑇
𝜇 �
𝜇 , solving for G(.) and replacing in the above 
equation, the Lagrangian takes the following expression: 
𝐿 = ∫ �𝑞(.) + 𝜆�𝑝𝑞(.) − 𝑤𝑅 + 𝗿 �∫ 𝐵´(𝑧(𝑡) − 𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + 𝑇 − 𝐵(𝑧(𝜇 �) − 𝜇)
𝜇 �
𝜇 ���
𝜇 �
𝜇 𝑛(𝜇)𝑑𝜇   
The problem is solved to establish the first order condition for z, from which it 
determines the value of the slack (the first order condition for K and L, where R 
is decomposed the results are not affected.) Differentiating the Lagrangian with 
respect to z, we obtain: 
 
 
Setting: 
𝐵(𝗼) =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ �𝑠1 ∗ 𝗼 − 𝑠2 ∗
𝗼2
2
�   𝑖𝑓    𝗼 ≤ 𝗼∗
(𝑠1 − 𝑠2 ∗ 𝗼∗) ∗ 𝗼 + 𝑠2 ∗
𝗼∗2
2
)  𝑖𝑓 𝗼 ≤ 𝗼∗
 
Being:    𝑠1 − 𝑠2 ∗ 𝗼∗ > 0 
Replacing  B'(.)  and  B''(.),  and  making  algebraic  simplifications,  the  optimal 
policy function for “hidden actions” is as follows: 
𝗼(𝜇) =
⎩
⎨
⎧
0                        𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜇 ≤ 𝜇∗
𝑠1 − Φ𝑞𝑧
𝑠2
+
𝑁(𝜇)
𝑛(𝜇)
        𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜇∗ ≤ 𝜇 ≤ 𝜇∗
 𝗼∗                         𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝜇∗ ≤ 𝜇
 
 
where:            Φ = θ / φ;       φ = δλ;        θ = 1 + λp ;       δ = (1 - γ) / γ 
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  "policy  function"  depends  on  the  distribution 
function of µ, and their parameters (p, γ, λ) are part of the solution to the first 
order condition that maximizes the welfare of the agent a'= b = B'(α)
2, through 
which  the  expected  compensation  demanded  by  the  “hidden  actions”  is 
established, so that if the deviation increases, the compensation should also 
increase. 
                                                           
2 The agent should choose the "slack" that allows him to maximize his well-being U(.) given by B(α) + G(E).  The 
Principal will induce  managers to "tell the truth” through G(E)= a(µ+α), given by  z=E.  Under this considerations, the 
first order condition sets:  b(µ + α) = B´(α), given by  b(E) = -a´(E), when function a(.) is convex and decreasing.  Where 
E = ũ ,  the maximum welfare is given when  U(µ, µ) > U(µ, ũ) = G(ũ)+B(z(ũ)- µ),  where  ũ it is his report and µ  the true 
value. So, whatever the value of α  chosen by the operator, he will always generate an unbiased estimator, that is ũ =µ.. 
 
( ) ( ) 0 ) ( ´´
) (
) (
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Finally, the function b(.) measures the rate of risk assumed by the agent in the 
contract to achieve the reported value, that is,  E = x, since E = z. This function 
is derived from the equilibrium condition of the agent maximization problem. 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 �
𝗼
[𝐺(𝜇 + 𝗼(𝜇)) + 𝐵(𝗼(𝜇))] 
𝑎´(𝜇 + 𝗼(𝜇))𝗾 + 𝐵´(𝗼(𝜇)) 
𝑏(𝐸) = −𝑎´(𝐸) 
𝑏(𝜇 + 𝗼(𝜇))𝗾 = 𝐵´(𝗼(𝜇)) 
Replace the function of α(µ) in B´(.) yields:  
 
𝑏(𝐸) =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
𝑠1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐸0 ≤ 𝐸 ≤ 𝑧1
𝑠1 − 𝑠2�
𝐸 − 𝑧1
𝑟 + 2
�
𝑠1 − 𝑠2𝜏(𝐸)
𝑠1 − 𝑠2𝗼∗
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑧1 ≤ 𝐸 ≤ 𝑧2
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑧3 ≤ 𝐸 ≤ 𝑧4
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑧4 ≤ 𝐸 ≤ 𝐸 �
 
 
In  Table  2, we can appreciate the model values. 
 
V. Non- Programmed investment under agent control 
Methodologically, the model it is solved with the estimation of the optimal policy 
function α(µ), fulfilling with the boundary conditions established in the previous 
section. Having estimated α(µ) we obtain the functions B(.) y b(.) from the agent 
maximization condition:  b(E) = B´(α).  With the risk ratio estimated b(E) the 
matrix compensation payments can be built. 
To  estimate  the  portion  of  the  investment  that  deviates  from  the  OBP 
programming and that can be controlled by the PWU´s manager; we assign 
values to the parameters related to the optimal policy function and calibrate the 
model with the reality, complying with certain boundary conditions. The model 
can be used to simulate different possible scenarios, relating both to the portion 
of the investment that deviates from the OBP and that could be avoided, as well 
as building a menu or a matrix of compensation payments to reduce it. 
5.1 Analysis of primary information 
Through the application of the "Budget and Expenditure Survey of the PWU", 
we have collected information that allowed us to parameterize the function of 
policy α(µ) and characterize the function of distribution of µ. 19 
 
The gathered information allowed us to have a good approximation of the levels 
of  deviation  between  the  different  types  of  expenditure  incurred  and  its 
programming or planning. In respect we can be stated that: 
•  On average, 47% of the investment portfolio for the regulatory period has 
changed  because some executed projects were not included in the OBP, or 
because others projects included in the OBP,  were not executed. 
•  The level of implementation of not included projects in the OBP, for the PWU 
that  filled  the  questionnaire,  is  approximately  50%,  showing  a  large 
dispersion among the data. 
•  The portion of planned projects financed with own resources that have not 
been executed or it won´t be executed, are relatively less. 
•  By adding these two variables: projects not included in OBP and amounts of 
own resources don´t executed (the latter weighted by the share of equity 
investment with respect to the total investment), we obtain a variable that 
measures the deviation of resources to other activities not scheduled in the 
OBP, referring not only to investment but also to current expenditure. We 
use it as a proxy variable of the deviation of the expenditure with respect to 
the programmed. Thus, on average, between 40% and 50% of the funds 
would be used in a non programmed form, either because they were not 
included in the OBP or because they are not executed. 
This reasoning is consistent with the results of the following questions: How 
much investment could have been executed if problems associated with third 
parties  had  not  happened?  (delays  in  the  bidding  process,  delays  in 
disbursements for the execution of works, among the main problems), and also 
with the result of the question: In which measure the investment programmed in 
the OBP has been used to prepare the Opening Institutional Budget (OIB)?. If 
the external problems would have not occurred, a 66% of the projects could 
have  been  executed,  and  the  33%  not  executed  will  remain  under  the 
responsibility of their own PWU. The 56% of the PWU use the OBP for making 
their OIB opening budget. 
From analysis of the OIB and the OBP can be noted: 
•  The  level  of  investment  project  execution  exceeds  the  investment 
programming in the OIB (Opening Institutional Budget), both in regard to 
own resources as other funding sources. This incidence is greater when it 
comes to third-party resources that from own resources. The inclusion of 
new projects is evident. 
•  The link of the level of execution of investment projects included in the OBP, 
with the projects execution of the OIB,  reveals that the OIB is not linked to 
the OBP at least a half. By having a larger deviation, we assume that the 
OIB is used to achieve the financing of the MEF. 20 
 
•  By contrast, the level of investment execution is around 60% regarding to 
the programmed in the IMB (Institutional modified budget); without consider 
outsiders this value reaches 78%. This indicates that along with changes in 
the OIB, many projects have been rejected. 
•  However, the execution of current expenditure on both the IMB and the OIB 
is almost 100%, which shows the difficulties in planning investments 
5.2 Definition of the variable z 
The analysis of data collected through the "Budget and Expenditure Survey of 
the PWU," establishes that it is necessary to define the variable z, referring to 
the portion of the investment that has changed with respect to the schedule,  
which includes executed investment that was not programmed in the OBP or 
that being a programmed investment was not executed for different reasons. 
The value of the variable z is multiple, operationally it will allow to: 
a)  Have  an  index  that  measures  the  magnitude  and  the  portion  of  the 
executed investment that was not programmed in the OBP or that being 
a  programmed  investment,  was  not  executed.  This  could  help  to 
implement new regulatory instruments or sanitation policy, such as the 
criteria for the distribution of the central government transfers, so as to 
encourage the EPS to improve the planning of their investments. 
b)  Estimate its impact on the PWU technical efficiency. 
c)  Construct  the  matrix  of  compensation  payments  which  provides 
compensation for agents if they decrease the value of  “z”. 
5.3 Estimation of the parameter values 
The  basic  information  required  for  model  parameterization  is  given  by  the 
distribution function n(µ), the knowledge about the opportunity cost or private 
benefit  function of the manger, and initial values for model parameters: λ, p, qz 
,γ,  M. 
The initial values of these parameters that describe the current situation are 
shown in the Table 2; however the calibration will consider the behavior of the 
random variable µ  and ranges of possible variation. 
As shown in Table 2, it is necessary to indicate that econometric estimates have 
been made to complete the estimation of model parameters, using as a source 
of information the "Budget and Expenditure Survey of the PWU" from 2011. 
Both for the elasticity of the budget (λ) and for the variable that captures the 
impact of changes in the proportion of investment that deviates from the OBP 
on production (qz), two estimations have been made, one through stochastic 
frontier  analysis  (SFA),  and  the  other  through  linear  regression  for  a  Cobb-
Douglas production function under the following specification: 
υ ν κ ) (KZ K AL Q = , 21 
 
considering capital as the relative length network and labor as the number of 
workers,  and  including  the  variable  m:  KZ    is  defined  as  "the  proportion  of 
investment  that  deviates  from  the  OBP,  multiplied  by  the  capital  factor”,  the 
same could be interpreted as a proxy for technical efficiency, so that  υ =
∂
∂
m
LnQ
 
measures the elasticity of m factor on production. In this case it is important to 
consider the variable z can be included in the model from a proxy variable to 
represent  it  as  a  portion  of  K.  For  the  analysis  of  borders  environmental 
variables  have  also  been  included,  such  as  PWU  size,  population  density, 
geographic  region,  pressure,  etc.  (using  the  database  of  the  Chahuara  & 
Lucich, 2011). The negative sign of the estimations show that the increasing of 
this proportion will affect the PWU´s production. This result is consistent with 
that obtained by Chahuara & Lucich (2011), about companies that do not follow 
the OBP are less technically efficient. 
Table 2  
Range of values of the model parameters 
Parameter  Value (UM)  Base Information   Range  
λ  Elasticity  of  billed  volume 
sanitation  under  budget 
changes (%) 
Econometric  estimation 
taken  of  the  database 
from  the  questionnaire: 
“Budget  an  Expenditure 
of EPS”.  
[0.01 - 0.09] 
p  Average  price  of  sanitation 
service (soles / m3) 
Direct observation.  [1   -   1.6] 
qz  Incidence of change of the 
proportion of non 
programmed investment on 
the production (sanitation 
services).  
Econometric  estimation 
taken  of  the  database 
from  the  questionnaire: 
“Budget  an  Expenditure 
of EPS”. 
[ -50,000  -   -10,000 ] 
 
γ  Participation  of  manager 
retribution with respect to  the 
total transfer. 
Direct  observation 
calibrated with the agent 
opportunity cost. 
[0,001  -  0,01] 
 
M  Private manager income with 
similar sells. 
Direct  observation  from 
the  agent  opportunity 
cost. 
200,000   400,000 
θ, δ, φ,  Φ  Φ = θ / φ;       φ = δλ;        θ = 1 + λp ;       δ = (1 - γ) / γ 
     Source: own 
Table 3 shows the values of the parameters of the model equations. There are: 
the policy function α(µ), the distribution function of µ, the private benefit function 
B(α) and the estimated risk rate function b(E). The range of variation of the 
parameters values are shown in Table 2. In no case, except for the negative 22 
 
sign of "the proportion of unplanned investment on production" qz, the variation 
in the value of the parameters shows a significant impact on the results. Thus, 
the sensitivity of α(µ) to the variation of γ  is minimal (1 to 2 percentage points), 
and also with respect to the variation of λ. Only when it is very small (0.03 to 
0.001), α(µ) increases by 30%. 
Table  3  
Model functions 
 
Function   Parameters  Values    Parameter
s  
Values 
                      s1α – (s2 / 2)α
2                                          If α < α*   
                     (s1 – s2α*)α  + (s2 / 2)α*
2                    If α > α*   
 condition:     v2 < b < v1  
v1 = s1  0.85       
v2  = s1  – 
s2α* 
0.02       
s2  0.03    y  61.484 
                     [1 / (r+1)](µ- µ )
                                        If µ ≤ m   
                   
  [1/(r+1)]{2[(m-µ)
r+1/(µ-µ)
r]-(µ-µ)}
    If  µ > m   
condition:     µ < µ  < µ    
C  0,002    µ  5 
r  0,5    µ  100 
m  52.5    α*  25 
                        0             
                                        If  µ  ≤  µ*   
                     (s1M -  qzΦ) / s2M  + h(µ)
     If  µ*  ≤  µ ≤ µ*   
                         α*                                     If  µ*  ≤  µ   
 
  where  µ*= µ+(r+1)[(1-s1)/s2];    
M  360,00
0 
  µ*      12 
qz  15,000    µ*  54 
λ  0.03    δ  -99 
p  1.00    φ  -2.97 
γ  0.01    θ  1.03 
                          s1              
                       For  E0 ≤  E ≤  z1    
                         s1 – s2  [(E-z1)/(r+2)]
      For z1 ≤  E ≤  z2   
                          s1 – s2 τ(E)           
          For z2  ≤ E ≤  z3   
                          s1 – s2α*   
                           For z3 ≤  E ≤  E   
 
b(E0<E<z1)  0.85    Φ  -0.35 
b(z1<E<z2)  0.40    z1  12 
b(z2<E<z3)  0.21    z2  80 
b(z3<E<E)  0.02    z3  86 
τ(z3)=α*  25    τ(z2)  27 
Where:        z1 = µ+ (r+1)[(1-s1)/s2];       z2 = m+(m-z1)/(r+1);      z3= y +α*;       τ(z2)=(z2-z1)/(r+2);    
τ(z3)= α*; 
  y  is solved numerically knowing the value of α* for         α*
  = [1/(r+1)] {2[(µ-m)
r+1/(µ-y)
r]-(µ-y)-(z1-u)}
        
µ*  is solved numerically knowing the value of α* for         α*
  = [1/(r+1)] {2[(m-µ)
r+1/(µ -µ*)
r]-(µ-µ*)-(µ*-µ)}
       
Source: own 
 
B(α)= 
where   h(µ)=N(µ)/n(µ) 
α(µ)= 
b (E)= 
h(µ)= 23 
 
Regarding the implication of the negative sign of the relationship established 
between production and "the portion of the investment that deviates from the 
OBP", it is necessary to indicate that this deviation will have an amplifying effect 
on  the  "optimal  slack",  since  the  deviation  not  only  distracts  the  manager´s 
attention for private gain but also generates a negative impact on production. 
The  Principal  should  further  increase  the  agent’s  participation  rate  (γ)  to 
increase production and encourage the agent to reduce the "slack" (b=B´); the 
"slack "generates less production and more incentives for further increase
3. 
We  should  point  out  that  when  simulating  a  situation  without  incentives  or 
without the compensatory payoff matrix, we assume a value for  γ close to zero. 
If the sanitation policy establishes that transfers are not granted, the PWU have 
to generate their own resources to incentive or compensate their managers, 
meaning that δ = 1, the slack will tend to zero (significantly reduced because the 
amplifying effect is lost in the numerator) 
The  model  estimations  are  robusts  in  terms  of  changes  in  the  value  of  the 
parameters,  not  affecting  the  results  in  the  range  of  variability,  which  is 
economically feasible, except for the change on the sign of the impact of z on 
the production levels. 
5.4 Expected value of hidden actions 
With the parameterized model and the knowledge of the distribution function of 
µ, we estimate the expected value of the investment amount that deviates from 
the OBP as a result of the hidden actions of the managers E[α(µ)], and we build 
a compensation payments menu with  the intention to propose the agents to 
reduce this deviation or "slack”. 
The estimate of "slack" reveals the amount of executed investment that was not 
programmed  in  the  OBP  or  that  being  a  programmed  investment  was  not 
executed. This investment can be avoided with an adequate planning and a 
system of incentives or retributions. 
To estimate the mean value of the slack, we define the distribution function of µ;  
and then, assuming certain distribution functions for µ  "we simulate the model" 
that  predicts  the  mean  of  the  portion  of  executed  investment  that  was  not 
programmed  in  the  OBP  or  that  being  a  programmed  investment  was  not 
executed.   
Whereas  the  investment  information,  obtained  through  the  questionnaire 
"Budget and Expenditure of PWU" is referring to the "total executed investment 
                                                           
3 A more slack due to less effort generates greater diversion of investment and lower production. But extending the 
model including the factor qzze does not change the results obtained in this study. 
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that was not programmed in the OBP or that being a programmed investment 
was not executed", and not to its minimum level that it is inevitable; we have 
agreed to estimate the values and distribution function of "µ" from only matching 
values between the “z-values observed" and the “z-values estimated" as a 
result to estimate the value of "slack" for different values of µ. 
The distribution function of µ  is exponential with mean of 13.84 which is about 
half  the  mean  value  obtained  with  z,  which  is  the  mean  value  of  the 
unscheduled  investment  from  the  OBP  or  not  executed  programmed 
investment
4.  
According to the result of simulation, the expected value of the “slack” for all 
PWU is 16.5%. This means that it is expected that the percentage of unplanned 
investment in the OBP (the average deviation of investment with respect to the 
OBP) by controllable causes by the PWU is 16%. Graph 2 shows that 90% of 
the time the deviation is less than 43%, with 30% of the time under 8%, and 
40% under 15%, which makes that the average of 16.5 % is not far from the 
central value. 
Graph 2  
Slack distribution 
 
                      Source: own 
 
However, it is important to note that by obtaining a coefficient of variation of 
1.46, we have proposed another function distribution for "µ" for PWU with "z 
values" above 7%, and then also other expected value of the “slack”.  
The results show some important changes that might suggest us to work with 
two menus of contracts. This would let us differentiate the PWU by type, giving 
                                                           
4 The fact that the collected data let us to fit the values of z and µ  to an exponential distribution implies that  the 
probability that the expected value of "slack" (as a result of the model) is less than the arithmetic average is high. Thus 
although the arithmetic average of µ is 13.8% (and the "slack" is 20%), the expected value of α(µ)  for all of the EPS is 
16%. 
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them incentives to compete, especially considering that many PWU may have 
underestimated the data recorded in the survey. 
 
Considering PWU with z-values reported above 7%, with an adjusted average 
of 40% (which has been adjusted to achieve the minimum amount of data for 
modeling with values of the sample itself), the estimation of the expected value 
of “slack” is at 35%. This means that for a segment of the PWU, the percentage 
of unplanned investment in the OBP that can be controlled by their managers is 
35%.  It  is  important  to  note  here  that  the  distribution  function  for  µ  in  this 
segment of PWU changes, going from exponential to a gamma distribution, that 
is closer to normal. This situation shows that for this group of PWU, the portion 
of the deviation is more focused and likely to show a pattern of behavior that 
should be studied if the schemes differ. 
 
Graph 3 
Slack* distribution 
 
                      Source: own 
 
 
 
VI.  Constructing the matrix compensation 
The matrix compensation payments can achieve the following objectives:  
a)  Determine the value of the compensatory payment required to reduce the 
slack in different amounts, and  
b)  Disclose from the PWU information regarding their "type" (in relation with 
their ability to management planning, political capture and risk taking) and 
regarding the percentage of unplanned investment that the PWU can control 
or reduce. We can reach this result, either by choosing some combination 
from the menu or even not choosing any. In this regard it is important to ask 
the  question  in  two  stages.  "The  answer"  or  inclusive  the  "no  answer" 
generates information regarding the characteristics of the management of 
the PWU, enabling differentiated regulatory policy measures. 26 
 
The compensatory payoff matrix shown in Table 4 has been constructed taking 
the  following  parameters  values:  cost-share  bi  and  rank  of  the  reported-
information  E,  which  have  been  collected  from  the  parameterized  model 
presented in the previous section. 
Based  on  these  values  the  matrix  has  been  completed  using  the  following 
equation a(Et-1)=a(Et)+½[b(Et-1)+b(Et)]*[Et-Et-1] proposed by Reichelstein (1992) 
allowing  to  satisfy  the  condition  b(E)=-a´(E),  and  the  following  assumptions 
about the main diagonal: the first component is "a(E) maximum" which is the 
maximum  compensation,  the  remaining  components  of  the  diagonal  were 
calculated by extrapolating the implementation of the "rate of return" b(E) as the 
value of risk (Coughlan & Gates, 2009) (see Table 4). The final component is 
zero, and we have assumed 100 000 nuevos soles as the maximum value of 
a(.). 
    Table 4:   
    Matrix of compensation payments (in thousands of nuevos soles) 
                                       
Source: own 
The  compensation  payment  is  calculated  as  follows.  Suppose  the  PWU  is 
committed  to  deviate  in  86%  and  actually  obtains  a  deviation  of  79%,  then 
receives a payment of 45 + 0.21 (86-79) = 46.5 thousand nuevos soles. 
The  flexibility  of  the  matrix  also  allows  the  following:  a)  the  choice  of  the 
expected value of the deviation z, that the PWU are committed to achieve b)  
the estimation of the reduction of the expected value of the deviation z based on 
the estimation of the slack and the expected benefit, c) the re-calculation of the 
expected benefit a(.), as a result of a better calibration after an election by the 
agents, d) the re-calculation of the maximum value a(.), considering information 
regarding to the disposition of EPS managers to take risk, and finally e) the 
breakdown of the ranges given the characteristics of the process choice and the 
function distribution of the variable µ, other than those that have been treated by 
the  r-symmetric  value.  For  the  present  case,  when  µ  has  exponential 
distribution, it is required an adaptation of the implicit distribution function from 
the theoretical model which assumed r-symmetric, and therefore of the ranges 
so that the values are contained in the particular election process. 
From the basic matrix, the augmented matrix is generated considering more 
value  for  E  and  x  (see  Table  5).  To  determine  the  amount  of  money 
corresponding  to  the  slack  reduction,  we  focus  on  (E, x)  = (25,  25)  with  a 
Inves.Dev. 
Estimated
Cost Share 
b (%)
E 11 79 86 90 b
11 100 44 -20 -47 85
79 58 47 -18 -45 40
86 55 45 25 -2 21
90 55 44 24 0 2
Investment deviation observed (%)27 
 
current  compensation  of  44  thousand  nuevos  soles  (actual  manager 
remuneration)  and  so  we  subtract  16.5%  that  corresponds  to  the  slack  or 
expected  value  of  hidden  actions  calculated  in  the  section  5.4,  earning  a 
compensation corresponding to 100 thousand nuevos soles. This means that if 
the  compensation  is  100  thousand  nuevos  soles,  managers  undertake  to 
reduce the deviation of the investment made with respect to its programming 
(that is z), up to 11%. 
Table 5  
 Matrix of compensation payments (in thousands of nuevos soles) 
   
        Source: own 
The main limitation in the design of the matrix of compensation payments is the 
maximum  value  estimated  a(.)MAX.  However,  this  value  is  associated  to  the 
opportunity  cost  faced  by  managers  when  deciding  on  the  execution  of 
investments, either by political pressure or by the execution of works related to 
interest groups. In this sense, any amount paid as compensation above their 
current pay is necessary; however, for purposes of implementation, this must be 
bounded. 
A  practical  solution  that  could  be  implemented  before  using  the  matrix  of 
compensation  payments  is  to  estimate  the  willingness  to  accept  a 
compensation  (WTA),  asking  managers  (through  the  construction  of  a 
hypothetical scenario) about how much money they would be “willing to accept 
as  bonus  for  reduce  the  slack",  in  order  to  reveal  the  behavior  that  the 
managers would have on whether or not to reduce the portion of "controlled 
investment" that deviated from OBP, which would allow to estimate the amount 
of  money  by  which  managers  should  be  willing  to  reduce  the  portion  of 
"controlled investment" that deviate from OBP. The optimal mechanism is one 
that achieves to  pay at least the private benefit. 
 
VII.  Conclusions  
The present work using the  "Budget-based scheme" approach developed by 
Kirby  et.al  (1991)  and  Reichelstein  (1992),  establishes  the  optimal  policy 
function to control the "hidden actions" of managers from Public Water Utilities 
Invest.Dev. 
Estimated
Cost Share 
b (%)
E 11           25           40           55           65              79           86           90           b
11                100         41           27           14           (2)               (17)          (35)          (50)          85            
25                89           44           30           16           -             (15)          (32)          (47)          75            
40                78           33           41           27           11              (3)            (21)          (36)          70            
55                68           23           31           38           22              7             (10)          (25)          65            
65                62           17           25           32           32              18           0 (15)          55            
79                55           10           18           26           26              24           6             (9)            40            
86                53           8             16           23           24              21           12           (2)            21            
90                53           8             16           23           23              21           12           0 2              
 Investment deviation observed (%) 28 
 
(PWU),  regarding  execution  of  investments  deviated  from  the  Optimized 
Business Plan (OBP), by regulating the “trade off” between reducing information 
rents and providing more incentives, so as to induce managers to reduce the 
slack or the executed investment not programmed in the OBP or that being a 
programmed investment, it was not executed, but under their control. 
A necessary condition for the existence of the optimal policy function is that the 
execution  of  investments  that  deviate  from  the  OBP,  includes  not  only  the 
portion of executed investment not programmed in the OBP but also the portion 
of the programmed investment that was not executed, so that the policy not only 
prevents the admission of other projects but also improves the use and planning 
of internally generated resources already committed. 
The  analysis  of  information  collected  through  the  "Budget  and  expenditure 
survey of the PWU" applied to the PWU, reveals that there is a high percentage 
of investment (47%) that deviates from its schedule in the OBP, however, most 
of the PWU reported that this was due to uncontrolled situations for them. 
Using  the  optimal  policy  function  to  control  the  "hidden  actions",  we  have 
estimated  in  16.5%  the  expected  value  of  the  "portion  of  the  executed 
investment  not  programmed  in  the  OBP  or  not  executed  programmed 
investment" which is controlled by the manager of the PWU and that can be 
reduced  from  the  total  investment  portion  that  deviates  from  the  OBP. 
Nevertheless, considering only enterprises that report z-values above of 7%, 
the estimation of expected value of slack (or portion of the executed investment 
that deviate from OBP) that managers can reduce, is 35%. 
The menu of compensation payments designed to reduce the effects of "hidden 
actions", and constructed from the estimated values of the parameters of the 
policy function, establishes the conditions to reduce the estimated investment 
portion that deviates from the OBP which is under the agent’s control. After 
estimating  the  opportunity  cost  faced  by  the  manager  to  follow  the  OBP,  is 
feasible to reduce by 16.5 percentage points the total investment portion that 
deviates from the OBP. The compensation payment must be at least the double 
in  regards  to  current  remuneration,  considering  the  current  salaries  of  the 
managers of the PWU. 
Whereas the reduction of the portion of executed investment that deviate from 
the OBP in 16.5% could generate at least 100 000 nuevos soles of annual 
increase in production that is equivalent to retribution required by managers for 
reach this  reduction,  then the compensation payment scheme is efficient. 
If  there  are  other  non-monetary  factors  that  may  be  present  in  the  private 
benefit function, especially those identified by Shleifer & Vishny (1994) in their 
work  Politicians and firms, it is recommended to adjust the expected benefit of 29 
 
the matrix according to a contingent valuation study on hidden actions before 
implementing the menu of compensatory payments. 
 
The used methodology allows us, from the observed data collected, to achieve 
the best prediction about the probability distribution of what we actually  can 
control and reduce in regards to the total investment portion that deviates from 
the OBP, and build an array of compensation payments that can respond to 
these behaviors and  features. 
 
Also, the methodology allows the agents to choose the parameters of the menu 
on which they will be evaluated (considering that they have more information), 
and also induces them to reveal their "type", not only in relation to their planning 
capacity (higher or lower) but also in relation to risk taking. 
 
Beyond the numerical results obtained, the work reaches to the application of a 
methodology that improves the planning investment of the PWU, which can be 
used in the design of sectoral and regulatory policy instruments. For example, 
the methodology could be useful to approve the investment budget, authorize 
the use of funds for investment or allocate the sectoral transfers among the set 
of the PWU that demonstrate greater compliance. 
 
Although this study could sophisticate their estimates even more, we consider 
the standardization of the criteria for constructing the matrix of compensation 
payments more relevant, in order that agents can make an efficient election 
from the incentives menu and avoid claims or strategic behaviors when they set 
the contract, especially when this model is used to estimate the willingness to 
accept compensation to reduce the diversion of investments with respect to the 
OBP. 
 
Finally, although through the use of the presented methodology we can identify 
and quantify the impact of hidden actions, and even analyze their effect on the 
production levels, what we should know and what is actually relevant for future 
research  is  the  efficiency  of  this  tool.  Therefore  we  should  know  if  the 
implementation  cost may  be  covered  with  the  improvement  in  the  quality  of 
provision. 
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